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______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of Orders From 
The Department of Homeland Security and 
The Executive Office for Immigration Review 
Agency No. A200-771-350 
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Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and KRAUSE, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 15, 2018) 
 
 
Christopher M. Casazza, Esq. 
The Law Office of David E. Piver 
150 Strafford Ave., Suite 115 
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Wayne, PA 19087 
 
  Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Kristen A. Giuffreda Chapman 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Division 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
450 5th Street, N.W. 
Room 10016 
Washington, DC 20001 
 
Nancy Canter 
John D. Williams 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Division 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
PO Box 878, Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
  Counsel for Respondent 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Abilio Sorto Bonilla petitions for review of the 
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) determination, in a reasonable fear 
proceeding, that he was not entitled to relief from his reinstated 
removal order.  Sorto Bonilla argues that his due process rights 
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were violated because the IJ conducted the proceeding without 
his counsel.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition.  
 
I 
 
Sorto Bonilla, a native and citizen of El Salvador, first 
attempted to enter the United States illegally in 2010.  The 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) deemed him 
inadmissible and he was removed to El Salvador.  He returned 
to the United States shortly thereafter without inspection or 
permission.  In May 2017, Sorto Bonilla was arrested and 
found to be the subject of a removal order.  He expressed a fear 
of persecution or torture if returned to El Salvador and was 
referred to a United States Customs and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”) asylum officer for an interview to determine 
whether his fears were reasonable.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(a)-
(b). 
 
Sorto Bonilla met with an asylum officer on four 
occasions.  The first three meetings ended before the 
reasonable fear interview began because Sorto Bonilla stated 
he wanted his attorney present.  At the fourth meeting, with his 
attorney present via telephone, Sorto Bonilla sat for a full 
reasonable fear interview.1  Sorto Bonilla told the asylum 
officer that he was afraid to return to El Salvador because he 
had been extorted by a gang there, and gang members 
attempted to recruit him because they thought he had received 
money from his family in the United States.  Sorto Bonilla said 
the gang members never physically harmed or threatened him 
                                              
1 Sorto Bonilla’s appellate counsel did not represent him 
before the DHS or IJ.   
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and he did not report these incidents to the police, but he was 
afraid of being robbed or harmed by gang members on account 
of his “political beliefs”—as an individual returning from the 
United States—and because he has light skin color.  A.R. 47.  
At the end of the interview, the asylum officer summarized 
Sorto Bonilla’s claim, which he and his attorney confirmed, 
and Sorto Bonilla’s attorney reiterated only that the gang 
targeted him for money because he came from and has family 
ties in the United States, and “because of his color.”  A.R. 50. 
 
The asylum officer issued a negative reasonable fear 
determination.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(f).  The officer 
concluded Sorto Bonilla had testified credibly, but the harm he 
experienced failed to rise to the level of severe physical injury 
or mental pain, and he thus failed to demonstrate a reasonable 
possibility that he would be persecuted or tortured in El 
Salvador.  Sorto Bonilla requested review by an IJ, see 8 C.F.R 
§ 208.31(f)-(g), and a hearing was set for June 1, 2017.  The 
notice setting the hearing informed Sorto Bonilla that the 
“Immigration Judge may allow you to be represented in this 
proceeding, at no expense to the Government, by an attorney,” 
and that “[i]f you wish to be so represented, your attorney or 
representative should appear with you at this hearing.”  A.R. 
34.2 
On June 1, Sorto Bonilla appeared before the IJ.  The IJ 
began the proceedings by stating that Sorto Bonilla was 
“present, and he does not have legal consultation today.”  A.R. 
22.  Sorto Bonilla did not request that the IJ postpone the 
                                              
2 Sorto Bonilla’s counsel confirmed that a hearing was 
set for June 1, 2017, but despite the plain language of the notice 
that counsel should appear, he assumed it would be held 
telephonically.   
5 
 
hearing or contact his attorney.  In an affidavit submitted four 
days after the hearing, Sorto Bonilla declared that he did not 
request that his attorney be present because he believed his 
attorney was listening on the phone and his counsel submitted 
a letter notifying the IJ of counsel’s error in not appearing at 
the hearing.   
 
The IJ reviewed Sorto Bonilla’s reasonable fear 
interview, and Sorto Bonilla reiterated (1) he “felt fear” but 
was not physically threatened or harmed by gang members 
who attempted to recruit him or asked him for money, A.R. 25; 
(2) he did not report the incidents to the El Salvadorian police; 
and (3) he was afraid to return to El Salvador because he 
believed the gangs would assume he has money since he would 
be returning from the United States.  He added that “I have [a] 
fear of returning, because I don’t feel safe in El Salvador.”  
A.R. 27. 
 
Based on the record and Sorto Bonilla’s statements, the 
IJ concluded that although Sorto Bonilla had a subjective fear 
of returning to El Salvador, resistance to gangs and a 
generalized fear of crime were not grounds for protection 
because they were not tied to a protected ground.  As a result, 
the IJ concurred with the asylum officer’s negative reasonable 
fear determination and returned Sorto Bonilla’s case to DHS 
for his removal to El Salvador.   
Sorto Bonilla petitions for review.3 
                                              
3 The day after the reasonable fear proceeding, Sorto 
Bonilla retained new counsel, who moved to reopen and 
reconsider the negative reasonable fear finding.  The motion 
was denied on the ground that the IJ’s determination could not 
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A 
 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and 
implementing regulations provide for the streamlined removal 
of an alien who was previously subject to a removal order but 
illegally returned to the United States.  Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(a)(5), “[i]f the Attorney General finds that an alien has 
reentered the United States illegally after having been removed 
. . . under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is 
reinstated from its original date.”  The prior removal order “is 
                                              
be appealed, 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(g)(1).  Sorto Bonilla does not 
challenge that ruling.   
4 DHS had the authority to reinstate Sorto Bonilla’s 
prior removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) and the 
exclusive jurisdiction to make the negative reasonable fear 
determination under 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(a).  The IJ, as part of 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review, has exclusive 
jurisdiction to review a negative reasonable fear determination 
under 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(a),(f),(g).  If the IJ concurs with the 
asylum officer’s decision that the applicant did not establish a 
reasonable fear of persecution or torture, then “the case shall 
be returned to [USCIS] for removal of the alien.  No appeal 
shall lie from the [IJ]’s decision.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.31(g)(1).  
The IJ’s decision thus constitutes a final order of removal over 
which we have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  
We review Sorto Bonilla’s constitutional due process claim de 
novo under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  See Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 
611 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2010). 
  
7 
 
not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not 
eligible and may not apply for any relief . . . , and the alien shall 
be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.”  
Id.  There is an exception to this bar.  An alien may seek 
withholding of removal if he has a reasonable fear of 
persecution.  Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35 
n.4 (2006) (citing 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A)).  Thus, a returning 
removed alien “has no right to a hearing before an immigration 
judge” unless the alien “expresses a fear of returning to the 
country designated in that order,” in which case the alien is 
“immediately referred to an asylum officer for an interview to 
determine whether the alien has a reasonable fear of 
persecution or torture.”  8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a),(e).  The purpose 
of the “reasonable fear . . . screening process [is to] ensure 
proper consideration of applications for withholding [of 
removal] . . . in cases subject to reinstatement of a previous 
removal order.”  Regulations Concerning the Convention 
Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8485 (Feb. 19, 1999).   
 
When an alien is referred to an asylum officer for a 
reasonable fear determination, the officer “conduct[s] the 
interview in a non-adversarial manner, separate and apart from 
the general public,” where the alien “may be represented by 
counsel . . . and may present evidence . . . relevant to the 
possibility of persecution or torture.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c).  At 
the end of the interview, the asylum officer reviews with the 
alien a “summary of the material facts” and provides the alien 
with “an opportunity to correct any errors therein.”  Id.   
 If the asylum officer concludes that the alien has met the 
reasonable fear standard,5 the officer must refer the case to an 
                                              
5 Under this standard, the alien must demonstrate a 
“reasonable possibility that he or she would be persecuted on 
8 
 
IJ “for full consideration” of the alien’s eligibility for 
withholding of removal, which is conducted with all 
procedural requirements attendant to removal proceedings, see 
id. § 208.16, including appeals to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals.  Id. § 208.31(e).  If, on the other hand, an officer 
concludes that the alien does not have a reasonable fear of 
persecution or torture, then the alien may request that an IJ 
review the officer’s “negative determination.”  Id. § 208.31(f)-
(g).  If a request for IJ review is made, then the IJ is provided 
with the “record of determination, . . . the asylum officer’s 
notes, the summary of the material facts, and other materials 
upon which the determination was based.”  Id. § 208.31(g).  If 
the IJ “concurs with the asylum officer’s determination that the 
alien does not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture,” 
the alien is removed.  Id. § 208.31(g)(1). 
 
B 
 
Sorto Bonilla argues his due process rights were 
violated because the IJ reviewed the asylum officer’s negative 
reasonable fear determination without his counsel present and 
failed to inquire about whether Sorto Bonilla wanted his 
counsel to be present for the IJ’s review proceedings, and he 
was prejudiced by his counsel’s absence.  We disagree.6   
 
                                              
account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group or political opinion, or a reasonable 
possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country of 
removal.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c). 
6 Because Sorto Bonilla alleges only that his due process 
rights were violated, we need not address the standard for 
reviewing the IJ’s negative reasonable fear determination. 
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 The Fifth Amendment guarantees aliens due process in 
all phases of deportation proceedings.  Serrano-Alberto v. 
Att’y Gen. U.S., 859 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2017).  In formal 
removal proceedings, the Fifth Amendment and the 
immigration laws provide aliens with the right to counsel.  8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4); Leslie v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 611 F.3d 
171, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2010).  In such proceedings, IJs are 
required to “[a]dvise the [alien] of his or her right to 
representation, at no expense to the government, by counsel of 
his or her own choice . . . and require the [alien] to state then 
and there whether he or she desires representation,” “[a]dvise 
the [alien] of the availability of pro bono legal services for the 
immigration court location at which the hearing will take place, 
and ascertain that the [alien] has received a list of such pro 
bono legal services providers.”  8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)-(2).  
An IJ’s failure to comply with that regulation entitles the alien 
to a new removal hearing without a showing of prejudice 
because the regulation protects a fundamental constitutional 
right.  Leslie, 611 F.3d at 180.  The right to counsel in removal 
proceedings is respected because of the complexity of “the 
adjudicatory process” in the immigration context, and because 
of “the grave consequences of removal.”  Id. at 181. 
 
Sorto Bonilla, however, is not in removal proceedings.  
Rather, he is in reasonable fear screening proceedings.  8 
C.F.R. § 208.31(a).  The purpose of the screening process is 
simply to determine whether an alien is entitled to a “full 
consideration of the request for withholding of removal,” id. § 
208.31(e), which, if he is, means that his request would be 
“adjudicated by the immigration judge in accordance of the 
provisions of § 208.16 [for the withholding of removal],” id.; 
see also id. § 1240.10(a).  Although the regulations state that 
an alien “may be represented by counsel” at the screening 
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process’ first step—the interview with the asylum officer, id. § 
208.31(c)—the regulations are silent as to whether an alien 
may have counsel present at the second step of the screening 
process before the IJ, id. § 208.31(g).7  Thus, Sorto Bonilla has 
not shown that the regulations explicitly invested him with a 
right to counsel at the IJ’s review hearing, and we need not 
reach the question here whether he otherwise has such a right, 
both because Sorto Bonilla “was not denied the opportunity to 
obtain the counsel of his choice[;] [h]is attorney simply failed 
to come through for him,” Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 
369, 376 (3d Cir. 2003), and because he concedes he was 
required to show prejudice and we conclude he has failed to do 
so.   
 
That is, first, even though the regulations are silent, 
Sorto Bonilla was notified that the IJ may allow him to be 
represented at the proceeding and instructed that his counsel 
should be present if he wished to be represented.  In addition, 
at the beginning of the proceeding, the IJ noted that Sorto 
Bonilla did not have counsel present, further reflecting that the 
IJ was cognizant of the value of legal counsel and did not 
deprive him of it.   
 
                                              
7 Notably, the asylum officer conducts the interview in 
a “non-adversarial manner” and the alien’s counsel may 
present a statement “at the end of the interview,” and the 
asylum officer “in his or her discretion, may place reasonable 
limits on . . . the length of the statement.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c).  
Thus, to the extent this provision grants a right to counsel, it is 
far more limited than that provided to aliens in removal 
proceedings.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a). 
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Moreover, Sorto Bonilla has not shown that he suffered 
prejudice by the absence of his counsel.  Sorto Bonilla’s 
counsel was present for the interview with the asylum officer 
and confirmed that the facts Sorto Bonilla presented were 
accurate.  Sorto Bonilla argues that, had his counsel been 
present for the IJ review, he would have explained that Sorto 
Bonilla belongs to a particular social group, namely 
“repatriated El Salvadorians.”  Petitioner Brief 27-28.  No 
counsel, however, could change the fact that Sorto Bonilla had 
not faced past persecution, and he has provided no facts or case 
law showing the El Salvadoran society would recognize 
repatriated El Salvadorians as a particular social group.  This 
is likely because the caselaw on this subject is decidedly 
against him.  See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 498 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (rejecting as “too amorphous” a proposed social 
group of “secularized and westernized Pakistanis perceived to 
be affiliated with the United States”).  Thus, Sorto Bonilla has 
not shown his counsel’s presence would have changed the 
outcome of his reasonable fear review proceedings.  Therefore, 
Sorto Bonilla did not suffer prejudice. 
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition.  
